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Productive investment
in the recent cycle
1. INTRODUCTION
This article analyses various factors that
help understand the behaviour of productive in-
vestment in the recent expansionary cycle and
its premature slowdown as from the year 2000.
Firstly, this behaviour is described, comparing it
with that of the previous cycle and with that ob-
served in other advanced economies, while re-
lating it to the habitual determinants of invest-
ment. Next, there is a discussion of some in-
vestment-related measurement problems,
which may partly explain the trend observed.
And finally, the potential influence exerted by
specific events in recent years – such as the
strong increase in foreign investment flows and
the climate of heightened uncertainty accompa-
nying recent developments in the international
economy – is analysed.
2. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PRIVATE
PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENT
During the recent expansionary phase of the
Spanish economy, the growth rate of productive
investment by private-sector corporations was
high, though lower than that observed in the ex-
pansion in the second half of the eighties. In the
period 1996-2001, it is estimated that this ag-
gregate posted annual average growth of 6.5%
in real terms compared with 10.7% between
1985 and 1990. The upper panel of Chart 1
tracks private productive investment (PPI) along
with investment in capital goods (1) (drawing on
Spanish National Accounts), while the lower
panel depicts the cyclical components of this
aggregate and of GDP, which highlight the less-
er relative thrust of investment in the second
half of the nineties. It can be seen that PPI be-
gan to slow down as early as 2000 and contin-
ued to do so, with greater intensity, in 2001, in
tow to the weakening of investment in capital
goods. Meanwhile, the private non-residential
construction component (which is also part of
PPI) retained greater buoyancy.
Undoubtedly, the situation of the Spanish
economy was, at the onset of this recent cycle,
far different from that prevailing in the mid-
eighties, when there was a very great need to
rebuild the capital stock in the wake of the in-
dustrial restructuring process. Conversely, by
the mid-nineties, the Spanish economy had al-
ready been substantially modernised, narrowing
the gap separating it from the more advanced
(1) The course of both variables is very similar, al-
though PPI (estimated on the basis of QNA data) includes
private investment in non-residential construction, while in-
vestment in equipment (obtained directly from Spanish Ac-
counts) has a small public investment component.
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economies. Nonetheless, the economy’s capi-
talisation needs are no less now. The second
half of the nineties has seen a substantial tech-
nological change associated with the develop-
ment of information and communications tech-
nologies. This has given substantial momentum
to investment in the advanced economies. As
Chart 2 shows, the intensity of the investment
process, measured by the investment ratios,
has been very high in terms of GDP in countries
such as the United States or the United King-
dom, although it has been lower in Spain than
in most of the developed countries whether
measured in real or nominal terms. Moreover,
the slowdown in investment in Spain, in particu-
lar in capital goods, took place ahead of that of
the euro area as a whole.
At a more detailed level, the information
available shows that the lesser intensity of the
investment process in the years 1996-2000,
compared with the period 1986-1990, was a
feature of both industry and non-financial mar-
ket services (see Chart 3). However, the decel-
eration of investment in 2000 began in industry
and only spread to services in 2001. According
to the disaggregated data of the industrial sur-
vey (see Table 1), which are consistent with the
information drawn from the Banco de España
Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBBE),
most industrial activities, except electronics,
saw investment moderate in 2000. In the elec-
tricity production and distribution industry, in-
vestment ran at a higher rate in 2000 owing to
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the need to meet higher than envisaged de-
mand, after several years’ lower domestic in-
vestment. In services, investment proved more
sustained. Indeed, in some capital-intensive ac-
tivities, such as transport and communications,
gross capital formation was more buoyant than
in the previous cycle. Nonetheless, in the case
of communications, following several years of
strong growth in the capital stock, incidents
bearing on the new areas under development,
such as the delay in UMTS technology, have
halted – at least temporarily – the substantial in-
vestment initially envisaged.
From the standpoint of its composition by
type of good, investment was centred during
the initial stage of the recent cycle on capital
goods, while non-residential construction was
less dynamic and tended to pick up as from
1999, when equipment began to turn. Accord-
ing to the data estimated on the basis of the
CBBE information, the strength of investment in
IT software and hardware was prominent in this
expansionary stage, proving notably more dy-
namic than other capital components, especial-
ly in market services. However, this type of
good still accounts for a relatively low propor-
tion of total investment, whereby its buoyancy
does not alter the comparatively moderate na-
ture of total investment (see Table 2).
Finally, the CBBE data on company size
show that the trend was very similar for all
groups over these years, with a significant ex-
pansion until 1999 and a heavy decline in 2000
(less markedly so in the case of large corpora-
tions) which, foreseeably, will have run into
2001. Until 2000 there was a strong increase in
the creation of new companies, mostly small
ones, with a significant repercussion on the to-
tal investment of non-financial corporations
(around 15%). This tendency was broken in
2001 when, according to the data provided by
the Mercantile Registry, almost 5% fewer cor-
porations were created than the previous year.
Set against the foregoing results, some of
the main conditioning factors of investment de-
cisions had shaped a fairly favourable environ-
ment in the second half of the nineties, warrant-
ing more expansionary behaviour. Demand
pressure proved a considerable force, as
shown by the fact that final demand (on Nation-
al Accounts figures) grew 5% in annual average
terms between 1996 and 2001, compared with
an average of 5.3% between 1985 and 1990.
Further, there was an unprecedented reduction
in the user cost of capital in real terms, as can
be seen in Chart 4. This reduction in the cost of
capital has been linked to the fall in the relative
price of capital goods in relation to output,
which is shown in the lower panel of Chart 2,
and, essentially, to the forceful cut in interest
rates, which stood at historically low levels as
the Spanish economy moved towards Monetary
Union membership. At the same time, non-fi-
nancial corporations have attained and sus-
tained high real profit ratios.
3. INVESTMENT MEASUREMENT
PROBLEMS
A prior question to the analysis of the condi-
tioning factors of investment concerns its meas-
urement, especially in real terms. As can be
seen in the lower panel of Chart 2, in Spain the
capital investment deflator, in relation to that of
GDP, moved on a declining trend as from the
eighties. This continued in the nineties, albeit
with less intensity than in previous periods and,
above all, less markedly so than in other coun-
tries such as the United States or the United
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Kingdom. The nineties, indeed, were the years
which saw the biggest expansion of investment
in goods associated with the new information
and communications technologies (ICT) which,
as they are products subject to sharp and con-
tinuous quality improvements, give rise to pro-
nounced biases in the measurement of chang-
es in their prices and, therefore, in the deflation
of their nominal magnitudes and the calculation
of their real magnitudes.
Some countries, such as the United States,
have introduced price adjustment techniques
for changes in product quality, based in many
cases on the hedonic method. That gives rise to
more marked declines in investment deflators
Sources: Central de Balances del Banco de España and Dirce.
(a)   Percentage covered by the Central Balance Sheet Data Office in relation to the total estimated by National Accounts for each branch.Coverage 
in respect of 1998 data (latest year available with this breakdown in National Accounts)
TANGIBLE GFCF:
Energy 73.6       9.7  -9.4  -5.8  4.9  21.4  4.1    
Industry 33.8       26.5  -0.2  9.1  17.8  -10.2  8.6    
Construction 12.7       -54.2  13.5  87.9  72.8  21.0  28.2    
Market services 15.8       3.4  -2.1  8.6  23.6  -10.7  4.6    
   Distributive trade 20.1       -20.5  -7.4  14.5  21.8  -1.5  1.4    
   Transport and communications 47.6       15.3  -3.2  4.3  20.4  -0.6  7.2    
   Other market services 5.8       3.2  12.4  17.2  36.4  -50.2  3.8    
Total 21.2       9.0  -3.0  7.5  20.1  -3.7  6.0    
Small 3.1  -3.3  21.4  48.2  -13.0  11.3    
Medium 14.2  5.2  27.5  24.8  -14.6  11.4    
Large 8.6  -3.9  4.4  18.4  -1.9  5.1    
FIXED ASSETS PER EMPLOYEE:
Energy 52.7  57.2  59.1  63.4  66.5  59.8    
Industry 4.7  5.2  5.3  5.4  5.8  5.3    
Construction 1.1  1.1  1.3  1.8  2.5  1.6    
Market services 9.1  9.3  8.8  9.2  9.6  9.2    
   Distributive trade 4.6  4.8  4.8  5.1  5.0  4.9    
   Transport and communications 17.0  18.2  18.4  18.4  18.1  18.0    
   Other market services 3.6  3.6  3.3  3.7  4.4  3.7    
Total 9.5  10.0  9.7  10.3  10.9  10.1    
Small 3.4  3.3  3.5  3.9  4.2  3.7    
Medium 4.4  4.6  4.7  4.6  5.0  4.7    
Large 10.9  11.4  11.1  11.8  12.2  11.5    
NUMBER OF COMPANIES CREATED:
Industry and energy -34.6  1.2  3.8  -7.4  0.0  -7.4    
Construction -36.1  -3.0  9.0  7.1  8.7  -2.9    
Market services -13.6  4.4  12.5  -0.9  10.4  2.6    
  Distributive trade -17.6  1.1  4.0  -2.9  6.6  -1.8    
  Transport and communications -9.4  -2.4  13.0  -5.6  -2.1  -1.3    
  Other market services -10.8  7.9  18.7  0.9  14.1  6.2    
Total -21.7  2.8  10.8  -0.5  9.0  0.1    
Without dependent employees -53.1  1.3  20.3  55.1  13.6  7.4    
1-50 employees 3.6  3.3  7.4  -44.4  5.3  -5.0    
Over 50 8.9  10.8  17.5  1.2  6.1  8.9    
Coverage
(a)
2000 1996-20001996 1997 1998 1999
 
.
Non-financial corporations: investment, fixed capital intensity and creation of companies
TABLE 1
Rate of change
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and, for the same nominal expenditure, to a
higher estimation of real-terms expenditure. In
Spain’s case, the use of more traditional tech-
niques for the adjustment of prices for product
quality changes in compiling the National Ac-
counts has led to an underestimation of the in-
crease in investment spending, in real terms, by
a significant – though not readily quantifiable –
amount, as is apparently inferred from the com-
parative trend of its deflator.
Indeed, research with Spanish data (2)
shows the existence of significant biases in the
deflators of certain products subject to a
marked technical change, such as ICT prod-
ucts, and also – albeit to a lesser degree – in
the case of transport equipment. When the
Spanish National Accounts investment deflators
are adjusted for the biases estimated in the
aforementioned research papers, the conclu-
sion is that investment in equipment would have
grown in Spain, between 1995 and 1999, by a
few percentage points more per year than the
original National Accounts estimates.
4. OTHER FACTORS THAT HAVE
INFLUENCED THE BEHAVIOUR
OF INVESTMENT
Admittedly, the possible under-estimation of
the growth of investment in real terms offers an
explanation for the low growth of this variable in
the second half of the nineties. But comparison
with other countries continues to show Spain to
have been relatively less dynamic in respect of
investment. It should be borne in mind that the
measurement problems in many European
countries are similar to those in Spain. Moreo-
ver, according to the current-prices comparison
offered in Chart 2, Spain’s investment ratio con-
tinues to be below those of other countries. An-
alysed below are other factors whose impor-
tance in the current context for explaining busi-
ness investment appears to have increased.
4.1. International dimension
of corporations: foreign
direct investment
One of the main changes Spanish corpora-
tions have undergone in recent years has been
their expansion abroad and internationalisation.
The sphere of investment decision-making is no
longer limited to the domestic market, but has
1992-1995 1996-2000
RATE OF CHANGE:
ICT 4.4        10.1     
Software 5.9        9.2     
Hardware 1.4        11.8     
Other capital 0.3        1.4     
PERCENTAGE OF FIXED CAPITAL:
ICT 5.8        9.0     
Other capital 94.2        91.0     
   Source: Hernando and Núñez (2002).
Contribution of ICT to growth
 of the capital stock
TABLE 2
Sources: INE and Banco de España.
(a)   In real terms.
(b)   User cost of capital relative to the user cost of labour.
(c)   The faint and bold lines relate to information from the Central 
Balance Sheet Data Office's respective Quarterly and Annual Sur-
veys. 
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taken on an international dimension. In this re-
spect, one factor that may have contributed
considerably to moderating domestic invest-
ment in the recent expansionary phase and to
prompting its deceleration in 2000 is its replace-
ment by investment abroad, which offered cor-
porations a more favourable expected return.
As can be seen in Chart 5, during the nine-
ties the Spanish economy became a net foreign
investor. Over the last six years, direct invest-
ment outflows have come to account for more
than half of those intended for investment in
capital goods. Specifically, in 2001, investment
abroad by Spanish corporations, though down
on the peak attained in 2000, accounted for
4.5% of GDP, against 7.2% for investment in
equipment. It is true that a sizable portion of this
investment has been made by the financial sec-
tor, whose weight in domestic investment is lim-
ited. But the other corporations involved in inter-
national expansion processes are generally
very capital-intensive (corporations in the elec-
tricity, oil, telephony and aeronautical indus-
tries), whereby their expansion strategy may
have limited domestic investment resources
and plans. Indeed, as the chart shows, resourc-
es earmarked for financing investment abroad
have been most substantial.
Several factors promoted the international
expansion of Spanish corporations during the
nineties. These included most notably the ongo-
ing transformation of Latin American econo-
mies, which created new investment opportuni-
ties via liberalisation, deregulation and corpo-
Sources: Ministerio de Economía and Banco de España.
(a)   To 1989, data are from the Economy Ministry's foreign tran-
sactions records and are the sum of direct and indirect investment in 
real estate.
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CHART 5 rate privatisation, accompanied by policies pro-
moting the inflow of foreign investment. Further,
Spain enjoyed here advantages derived from its
close linguistic and cultural links with these
economies. The heightening of foreign invest-
ment may also have been favoured by more
general developments, such as greater integra-
tion of international markets and the process of
economic and monetary integration in Europe.
It should be borne in mind that, although the
significance of these factors may have lessened
recently, the investment routed abroad in past
years continues to require resources, which
condition and limit their availability for domestic
investment.
From the domestic standpoint, investment
abroad has been made by corporations belong-
ing to mature industries, which have continued
attaining high profits from their national activity
but without obtaining sufficiently wide margins
to warrant fresh investment on a significant
scale. This has been more patent in certain in-
dustries – electricity and communications –
which had traditionally operated as monopolies,
and which have recently been immersed in lib-
eralisation processes. In some of these instanc-
es, the incentives for promoting the entry of
new competitors have not sufficed to bring
about the additional investment that might have
been expected.
4.2. Worsening expectations against
a background of greater risk
and uncertainty
In more general terms, it should be recalled
that any new investment will be evaluated in
terms of its expected return, adjusted for risk,
set against the cost of financing new projects.
In this respect, the parameters determining
these variables have tended to worsen of late.
Profitability expectations have fallen below the
actual return on existing investment, while risk
and uncertainty have increased notably and so
too has the cost of new financing.
Expectations regarding the outlook for activi-
ty are an important explanatory factor of invest-
ment owing to their influence on the required
expected return thereon. As Chart 6 shows, the
start of the recent upturn saw a growing firm-
ness of business confidence in industry. This
was temporarily curtailed as a result of the
emerging market crisis in 1998-99, which gave
rise to a drastic change in the world growth out-
look. The consequences of this crisis were very
limited. But after the interlude of the year 2000,
the loss of confidence intensified in 2001 when
the fresh deterioration in expectations was ex-
acerbated by a significant increase in uncertain-
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ty, owing to the difficulty of assessing the impact
that the Argentine crisis and the September 11
attacks might have on the world economy.
Greater uncertainty, amid slowing aggregate
demand, fewer internally generated resources
and higher debt ratios, may have led corpora-
tions to exercise the so-called option to wait to
invest. This option is related to the irreversible
nature of investment, which immobilises re-
sources over the long run and entails high dis-
engagement costs. Although resort to the op-
tion to wait to invest is usual at times of cyclical
change, on this occasion it may have been
strengthened by singular events such as those
mentioned above. These have had significant
consequences for some specific industries
(banking, oil, airlines, tourism), and have con-
tributed to generating a widespread sensation
of instability, to delaying expectations of recov-
ery and to deferring decisions on new invest-
ment and the creation of companies. These ef-
fects appear to have been particularly substan-
tial in 2001. Among the factors having a bearing
on the lesser momentum of investment, the re-
sults of the half-yearly investment survey of in-
dustry for 2001 point to the deterioration of de-
mand, of technical factors and of companies’ fi-
nancial situation, along with the highly adverse
influence of other types of more idiosyncratic
factors. The data on the creation of new compa-
nies discussed in section 2 would likewise de-
note a significant deterioration in expectations
in 2001.
Against the background of a significant in-
crease in risk, the return demanded on invest-
ment is higher. Consequently, the high rates of
return on installed assets reflected in the CBBE
data do not suffice to guarantee investment. Yet
in these circumstances, and given the higher
level of debt, the cost of borrowed funds for
new projects also increases. A broad indicator
of how greater risk may have affected the cost
of financing is the spread of the return on pri-
vate debt over that on swaps (see Chart 6),
which has widened significantly since the start
of 2000. This phenomenon is also apparent in
the downgrading of certain major Spanish and
European companies’ debt by rating agencies.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The relatively moderate growth of productive
investment during the 1996-99 upturn (com-
pared with previous cycles) and its premature
slowdown as from 2000 do not appear to be re-
lated to the favourable behaviour of some of its
main determinants, such as the momentum of
demand or the low cost of capital, amid finan-
cial conditions that are also highly favourable
and high returns on installed capital. Moreover,
the need to renew the capital stock has in-
creased following technological advances in the
information and communications field, which
have led investment in other advanced econo-
mies over this same period to expand more in
comparative terms.
The difficulties of measuring investment in
real terms arising from rapid technological
progress mean that, in all likelihood, the growth
of investment over the recent period is underes-
timated in National Accounts figures. As these
measurement difficulties are greater now than
in the eighties, they may help explain the in-
vestment growth differential between both ex-
pansionary cycles. However, they do not clarify
to the same degree the more moderate trend of
Sources: Ministerio de Industria, European Commission and Banco 
de España.
(a)   Influence on investment of total demand per the half-yearly in-
vestment in industry survey. This variable, which relates to year t, is 
included in the surveys conducted in autumn in years t and t-1.
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investment in relation to other advanced econo-
mies.
Among the potential factors contributing to
tempering the rate of productive investment in
the second half of the nineties, importance may
be attributed to the fact that Spanish corpora-
tions have preferred to take advantage of the
foreign investment opportunities emerging over
this period, having earmarked substantial own
and – especially – borrowed funds in this con-
nection. Foreign direct investment in the past
six years has accounted for more than half of
that assigned to investment in capital goods. At
the same time, however, the attractiveness of
investment in similar industries in the Spanish
economy has not risen by the same degree.
The various international crises disrupting
the recent expansionary phase have tended to
moderate Spain’s growth expectations, generat-
ing moreover a climate of uncertainty which
heightened in 2001 further to the adverse ef-
fects of the September 11th attacks and to the
crises in certain economies such as the United
States and Argentina. These circumstances ac-
quire greater relevance in a setting of greater
openness, in which certain large Spanish cor-
porations that have opted for expansion abroad
have been directly affected. Against this back-
drop, the cost of financing for new investment
projects also appears to have increased, a rise
associated with greater uncertainty and with the
growing level of Spanish corporations’ debt.
The foregoing aspects offer reasons justify-
ing the moderate growth of investment, al-
though no single factor suffices to explain it.
Clearly, although the returns obtained by com-
panies on their domestic activities have been –
and still are – high, the expected net returns on
additional domestic investment have not proven
sufficient set against the existence of foreign al-
ternatives deemed more attractive, or against
the greater risks associated with the climate of
uncertainty in which recent decisions have been
taken. In the coming quarters, as the interna-
tional economy picks up, and – probably – in a
less attractive environment for foreign direct in-
vestment, it is foreseeable that domestic invest-
ment will also progressively recover.
Nonetheless, the analysis conducted in this
article suggests that if this recovery is to gain
sufficient momentum and provide the Spanish
economy with the level and type of capital it re-
quires, then it will also be necessary to enhance
the economy’s attractiveness as a destination
for new projects. In this respect, the crafting of
policies promoting labour- and product-market
flexibility and efficiency, incentives for invest-
ment in human capital and initiatives conducive
to the pursuit of business activity and the imple-
mentation of new projects will make investment
in Spain more attractive, and will further help
steer investment towards those industries with
most growth potential.
19.4.2002
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